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NOTES
COMPULSORY INTERVENTION OF THIRD PERSONS BY
DEFENDANTS IN CONTRACT ACTIONS
It is a fundamental principle of pleading that the determination
of the parties defendant in any action is made by the person who
commences it. That is not to say, however, that only those parties the
plaintiff so designates may be defendants. Nearly all the courts recog-
nize the right of a defendant to bring in as a co-defendant a third
party who is necessary to a complete determination of the controversy.1
Likewise, most of the code states have statutory provisions which
allow compulsory intervention in cases coming under a situation where,
if the plaintiff prevails, the defendant will thereby acquire a right of
action against a third person. The Wisconsin and New York statutes
may be taken as typical.2
Cases involving promissory notes are by far the largest class in
which the question of compulsory intervention is presented. In a late
case decided in Oregon where an action was brought by a real estate
broker against the maker of a note given for brokerage services
rendered the maker, the latter was not allowed to bring in the plain-
tiff's partner and sureties, when defendant counterclaimed for dam-
ages on the ground of inducement by fraudulent representations to
enter the agreement. The Oregon court, in support of its decision, gave
the reason that the third parties would not be injured by a determina-
tion between plaintiff and defendant. In effect, it held that the third
parties were not necessary, and on that ground sustained the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion.3 Again, in a Colorado case, the
makers of a note were not allowed to bring in the payee, in an action
by the indorsee against the makers, where the cross-petition of the
latter alleged fraud on the part of the payee in securing the note,
but failed to allege that the defendants relied upon the fraudulent
representations. 4 Also, in Cooper v. Gilbert,5 the high court of Okla-
homa reaches a result in harmony with the decision of the Colorado
1 Wis. STAT. (1939) § 260.19 (1) ; Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch Co., 94 Utah 134,
76 P. (2d) 234 (1938) ; Minnesota National Bank of Duluth v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society of United States, 197 Minn. 340, 267 N.W. 202 (1936);
Schmidt v. La Salle Fire Insurance Co. of New Orleans, 209 Wis. 576, 245
N.W. 702 (1933); Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Crawford, 229
Ky 254, 16 S.W. (2d) 1041 (1929).2 The principal Wisconsin statute is as follows: Wis. STAT. (1939) § 260.19 (3)
--"A defendant, who if he be held liable in the action, will thereby obtain a
right of action against a person not a party may apply for an order making
such person a party defendant and the court may so order." The equivalent
New York statute is Section 193 (2) of the NEw YORK CIVIM PRACTICE ACT.
3 McGilchrist v. Fiedler, 155 Ore. 616, 65 P. (2d) 388 (1937).
4Dowdey v. Maxwell, 73 Colo. 268, 215 Pac. 146 (1923).
5 40 F. (2d) 260 (C.C.A. 10th, 1930).
court in Dowdey v. Maxwell,' holding that in an action on a note,
refusal to make a party defendant one who induced defendant to
become involVed in the transaction without consideration was not
error. In the Cooper case the court said the joinder of parties sev-
erally liable on the same instrument is optional with the plaintiff, and
additional parties are justified only where it clearly appears they have
or claim to have some interest in the controversy, or they are essen-
tial to a complete determination of the suit. In a later case which was
an action on a note for $16,000 made by Wood & Co. payable to the
order of C. Woods, and the executor of the estate of C. Wood brings
the suit, this court held that where plaintiff's action is in law for money
only, he may choose his defendants and can not be compelled to sub-
mit to intervention of parties on the ground that they are entitled to
a part of the money so sought, if in such action the satisfaction of the
judgment would operate to release defendants and the defendants may
not require plaintiff to admit new parties defendant, where the
defendants sued claim no equities or defenses against such new
parties.7 But in Johnson v. Cullinans it was held that where the payee
of a note sued the principal maker thereof, without joining the endorser
as may be done under Oklahoma statutes, there is no authority for
making such indorser a party defendant, at the instance of the prin-
cipal maker, under a pleading setting up matters creating equities
between such principal maker and indorser which, if true, would render
such indorser liable for all or any part of the note, but which constitute
no defense against the plaintiff. It also appears that where a surety
upon a note has the same defenses which the maker has, the surety can-
not implead the maker as a co-defendant.9
In New York, however, the fact that the obligation of notes was
assumed by third parties with the consent of plaintiffs was justification
for granting defendant's motion to bring in these third parties by
counterclaim.10 But in New Mexico, where the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law makes a maker of a promissory note primarily liable,
an accommodation maker is not entitled to have the party for whose
benefit he signed made a party, when such third party did not sign,
and the accommodation maker is being sued on the note."' However,
the state of Nebraska appears to have a more equitable rule, as
illustrated by the case of Farmers & Merchants Bank of Ulysses v.
Tate,'2 where in an action by the indorsee of a promissory note against
673 Colo. 268, 215 Pac. 146 (1923).
7 Wood & Co. v. Wood, 169 Okla. 217, 37 P. (2d) 256 (1934).
894 Okla. 246, 221 Pac. 732 (1925).
9 Prentice v. First National Bank, 101 Okla. 232, 224 Pac. 963 (1924).
10 Williams v. Edward De V. Tompkins, Inc., 211 App. Div. 17, 206 N.Y. Supp.
637 (1924).
"First Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Flournay, 24 N.M. 256, 171 Pac. 793 (1918).
' 96 Neb. 142, 147 N.W. 213 (1914).
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the maker alone, the maker by answer alleged that the transfer of the
note by the payee to the indorsee was without consideration and a mere
device to enable the latter to fraudulently collect the note for the
benefit of the payee. But the courts of the state of North Dakota have
a contrary rule as shown by the case of Bolton v. Donovan.13 Indiana
has taken an extreme position on this question. Such was indicated
in Smallhouse v. Thompson14 where in a suit by an assignee upon a
promissory note against the maker, the answer of the maker that the
payee had notified him that the alleged assignment to plaintiff was
invalid, and that he must not pay the assignee, did not help defendant
maker in his application to have the payee made a party. The court
reached a technical result, denying defendant's application for the rea-
son that it should have been made upon affidavit before answer. In a
later case this court refused to allow one who agreed to become surety
but who did not so become in fact, to bring in the buyer who made
the note to secure the purchase of goods.' 5 In Indiana, apparently, the
party sought to be brought in must be a party to the note, if the
impleading is to be done by answer.1 6 An interesting case in the state
of Washington was an action brought on a note which was secured
by a mortgage on growing crops of wheat. A judgment was sought for
the value of the wheat against W, to whom a negotiable warehouse
receipt for the wheat had been transferred, on the ground that he had
received and converted the wheat. The Supreme Court decided that
the warehouseman was at least a proper party, thus overruling the
trial court's denial of W's motion to interplead him.'7 This liberal
holding is quite opposed to the strict rule of the court of New York
in the case of Levin v. Lax & Abowitz, Inc., where the maker of a
purchase money note was not permitted to implead the payee in a
suit brought by the indorsee, and the maker had alleged breach of
warranty as to the efficiency of the machinery for the purchase of
which the note was given. 8 On an entirely different point, in the matter
of contribution, the high court of California decided that the settle-
ment of contribution between guarantors is not a sufficient question to
entitle guarantors-defendant to implead co-guarantors who were not
sued.' 9
A most interesting problem is presented by those cases which are
not clearly of the type where defendant will acquire a cause of action
against a third party, if the plaintiff succeeds. Thus, in New York,
is 9 N.D. 575, 84 N.W. 357 (1900).
14 17 Ind. 204 (1861).
25 Webster v. Smith, 4 Ind. App. 44, 30 N.E. 139 (1892).
Ir Heaton v. Lynch, 11 Ind. App. 408, 38 N.E. 224 (1894).
27 Arnold v. Peasley, 128 Wash. 176, 222 Pac. 472 (1924).
18 137 Misc. 132, 241 N.Y. Supp. 486 (1930).
29 Merchants Trust Co. v. Bentel, 10 Cal. App. 75, 101 Pac. 31 (1909).
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a creditor's executrix commenced an action against the insurer of the
debtor. The policy of life insurance carried a provision that the insurer
was to pay the insured's debt to the creditor, and the remainder to go
to the widow of the insured. However, upon the death of the insured
his widow notified the insurance company to pay no one except her-
self. But the company denied all liability, whereupon the executrix of
the creditor's estate commenced the action. Here the defendant insur-
ance company moved to bring in the widow as a party defendant, and
the trial court's denial of this motion was upheld. Clearly, the reason
for the decision is the fact that the issue between the plaintiff and
defendant could be completely determined without the presence of
the third party, and defendant, by force of the express provision in the
policy, would incur no liability (other than as provided in the policy)
in favor of the widow, in case the plaintiff prevailed.20 However, in
a late Minnesota case, the refusal of the trial court to bring in as
defendants creditors of insured's estate who claimed that the premium
on the policy had been paid in fraud of creditors, and the action was
brought by the guardian of a minor beneficiary under a life policy
against the insurance company was held an abuse of discretion.21
A Kentucky decision states that the defendant's application after the
court had announced its decision against defendant was made too late,
and, consequently, the court refused to bring in the third party. In
this case the defendant insurance company knew of the existence of
the policy, which covered the same property, issued by the third party
(insurer), at the time defendant made the settlement of loss under
its policy, and had ample opportunity to bring in the third party in an
action subsequently brought against defendant, notwithstanding the
settlement.2 2 Another New York adjudication decides that a liability
insurer could not be brought into an action where the policy required
judgment against insured, and a money satisfaction thereof, as a con-
dition precedent to the insurer's liability.23 The court seems to base
its decision on the ground that when the insurer merely "may" be
liable was insufficient where the statute authorizes bringing in an
additional party "who is or will be liable" to the defendant.
Likewise, decisions involving brokerage contracts present interesting
problems. A rather late decision held that in an action for broker's
commissions on a sale of defendant's property, defendant should be
permitted to bring in as a party defendant the person to whom she
2 0 Montague v. Jewelers' Tradesmen's Co., 41 App. Div. 530, 58 N.Y. Supp. 715
(1899).
21 Minnesota National Bank of Duluth v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of
United States, 197 Minn. 340, 267 N.W. 202 (1936).22 Prussian National Insurance Co. of Stettin, Germany v. Terrell, 142 Ky. 732,
135 S.W. 416 (1911).
23 Kromback v. Killian, 215 App. Div. 19, 213 N.Y. Supp. 138 (1925).
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paid the money, under a mistake of fact, and against whom, in event
of recovery against her, she will have an action for the money so
paid.24 Then, in Van Cott v. Marion De Cries, Inc.25 the purchaser of
property was held not a "person liable" for the broker's claim for
commission against the vendor. Here the court said that the vendor
would be liable to the purchaser in any event, and the only damages
recoverable against the purchaser would be the difference between
the purchase price and the value of the land sold. In the earlier case
of Lewis H. May Co. v. Mott Avenue Corp.26 it was held that a vendor
of realty who was sued for commissions on a sale by a real estate
broker was not entitled to bring in the purchaser, who represented that
there was no broker in the transaction, as defendant. In that decision
useful rules are found to guide a defendant in seeking to implead third
persons. The court states that an application by defendant having a
claim against the third person to have such person brought in should
be granted (1) where the third person is liable to plaintiff jointly or
severally with defendant, or where either he or defendant is liable for
the claim sued on or (2) where, irrespective of the third person's liabil-
ity to plaintiff for such claim, he is liable to indemnify defendant.
A fact situation of a different character, inasmuch as the broker was
sued, is found in the case of Sullivan v. Crawe27 where the vendor sued
the broker for the purchase price of a saloon, which the broker sold on
an arranged commission. The defendant was not permitted to join as
co-defendant the vendee who repudiated the sale and demanded return
of the purchase price on account of unauthorized fraudulent represen-
tations of the broker as to the value of the business, because the right
of the two parties to recover from the broker does not depend upon
the same state of facts, and he may be liable to both.
Breach of warranty cases have given rise to decisions affecting the
problem of joinder. In an action by a husband and wife against a
retailer of a dress which was sold to the wife under a warranty of
fitness, for injuries to the wife allegedly caused by the dress, the
defendant retailer was not allowed to bring in as a party defendant
the vendor from whom he purchased the dress.2 81n a case in the same
state which was decided somewhat earlier it was held that where a
defendant was sued for breach of warranty of a boiler, he was not
entitled to bring in as defendant a third party, whom defendant
allegedly would be entitled to sue for alleged negligence in the con-
24Merritt v. Rhodes, 232 App. Div. 422, 252 N.Y. Supp. 114 (1931).
2537 F. (2d) 48 (C.C.A. 2d, 1930).
26 121 Misc. 398, 201 N.Y. Supp. 189 (1923).
2772 App. Div. 5, 76 N.Y. Supp. 98 (1902).
28 Deal v. Lilyan Bertell, Inc., 168 Misc. 254, 5 N.Y.S. (2d) 772 (1938).
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struction and installation of the boiler, since the claims were wholly
unrelated.
29
Likewise, the problem of compulsory joinder of defendants has
arisen in a considerable number of cases which might be termed ordi-
nary contract cases, to distinguish them from the special types of
breach of contract cases. In a case where a defendant filed a counter-
claim in a suit for the breach of a contract made between it and the
plaintiff's assignor, claiming to be entitled to certain profits made by
the assignor, it was held that the defendant was not entitled to join
the assignor as a party defendant.30 Also, a Kentucky case states that
joint owners were necessary parties to a suit brought to recover on a
contract executed by one of them with a power company, granting
the latter the right to construct a power line over the land, and the
proper method to make them parties is by pleading. Here the suit was on
the contract, but plaintiff, who executed the contract, was one of three
joint tenants. The court overruled defendant's motion to make the
other two joint tenants parties.31 In one of the few decided cases in
the state of Connecticut involving the problem of compulsory joinder
it was held that in an action for an auto insurance premium, an order,
made when the case was nearly closed, citing in an additional party
defendant, was within the court's discretion where the parties stipu-
lated that evidence introduced theretofore might be used with the same
force as if introduced thereafter. The action was brought against the
party who insured the car, and the party impleaded was his daughter
in whose name defendant put the car, because he wanted her to have
it after his death.3 2 In another case it was held that in an action to
recover a down payment on a land contract, on the ground of the
purchaser's infancy when the contract was executed, in which vendors
counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract and claimed plaintiff
was a mere agent, the vendors were not entitled to have plaintiff's
alleged principals brought in as defendants. 33 Nevertheless, in an action
by an assignee for balance due on an account, in which action defendant
sought damages by cross-complaint, the trial court refused defendant's
motion to have the assignor made a party, and this ruling was upheld
upon appeal."4
New York decisions involving the problem of compulsory joinder
of defendants in contract cases are frequent. An unusual New York
29 Feuer v. Fenton, 162 Misc. 887, 295 N.Y. Supp. 918 (1937).
30 William P. McGarry Co. v. Andrew Weston Co. Inc., 286 N.Y. Supp. 2 (N.Y.
1936).31 Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Crawford, 229 Ky. 254, 16 S.W.
(2d) 1041 (1929).
32Martin J. McEvoy, Inc. v. Iannantuoni, 104 Conn. 372, 132 Atl. 895 (1926).33 Zauderer v. Market St. Long Beach Realty Corp., 128 Misc. 364, 218 N.Y.
Supp. 669 (1926).
34 McElroy v. Andrews, 178 Wash. 1, 33 P. (2d) 379 (1934).
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case, decided in 1932, held that a corporation sued for attorney's fees,
cannot interplead another attorney employed for the same purpose.3 5
Another decision held that a warehouseman was not entitled to bring
in the original bailor as defendant. There the suit was on a warehouse
receipt, indorsed in blank, and received as security for payment of
notes, for failure to deliver the quantity of coffee covered by the
receipt, on demand. The warehouseman's answer alleged that he had
delivered the coffee to the original bailor on her representation that
she still owned the receipt, without showing anything connecting
plaintiff with such delivery.36 In an action by a purchaser's assignee to
recover a down payment on the purchase price of realty and expendi-
tures in examining title, on the ground that the vendor's title was
unmarketable, the vendor was allowed to bring in as a defendant the
vendee named in the contract, and by counterclaim to seek specific
performance against such vendee.3 7 Again, in an action in contract
the defendant could join additional parties alleged to have conspired
against her, where defendant counterclaimed for damages alleging
fraud and duress in obtaining her signature, and asking for cancella-
tion of the contract. 88 Also, in an action for delay in forwarding goods
shipped, a notice of claim served by defendant on a railroad company
was held to state a cause of action for unreasonable delay, entitling
defendant to have the railroad brought in as a defendant.3 9 In another
case involving the forwarding of goods, where affidavits supporting a
shipper's motion to bring in a forwarding company as a defendant,
in an action by the Director General of Railroads for freight, on the
ground that the shipper might have a cause of action over against the
forwarding company for not disclosing that it was an alien enemy,
resulting in stopping of shipment, was held insufficient in the absence
of an allegation tending to show any wrong by the forwarding com-
pany.40 A case decided in 1923 held that in an action by a buyer
against a seller for damages caused by impurities in beer coloring sold,
the seller was not entitled to have the party who sold to him brought in
as a defendant.41 But, where the original defendant claimed that in
contracting for lighterage service from plaintiff it acted as agent for a
third party, which was bound to reimburse it for liability assumed, it
35 Strauss v. Grande Maison De Blanc Inc., 237 App. Div. 83, 260 N.Y. Supp. 368(1932).36 Williams v. Flagg Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Misc. 566, 220 N.Y. Supp. 124
(1927).3
7 Nasha Holding Corp. v. Ridge Bldg. Corp., 221 App. Div. 238, 223 N.Y. Supp.
223 (1927).38 Galloway v. Wolfe, 232 App. Div. 163, 249 N.Y. Supp. 608 (1931).39 Wichert, Inc. v. Gallagher & Ascher, 206 App. Div. 756, 201 N.Y. Supp. 186(1923).
40 Hines v. National Gum & Mica Co., 124 Misc. 511, 208 N.Y. Supp. 460 (1925).
42 Neuss, Hesslein & Co., Inc. v. National Aniline & Chemical Co., Inc., 120
Misc. 164, 197 N.Y. Supp. 808 (1923).
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was within the court's discretion to order such third party to be im-
pleaded as a defendant. 42
In a Kansas case it was held that a motion to bring in as defendant
another obligor on the bond is addressed to the trial court's discretion,
and the denial of such motion is not prejudicial error. The court stated
that the party for whose benefit a redelivery bond is given in a replevin
action may sue either or all of the obligors on the bond; in the
instant case only one of the obligors was suedL3 Nevertheless, the high
court of the state of Utah decided that it was error for the trial court
to order a third party in as defendant, on request of defendant in his
answer, but without any allegations justifying it, where the defendant
agreed to construct a canal for an irrigation company, and the work
was to be performed under the supervision of the company's engineer,
whose measurements and determination of the amount of work were
to be final. The defendant subcontracted to the plaintiff, who performed
the work and received pay according to the engineer's measurements,
and then sued defendant for a balance allegedly due, claiming that the
measurements were incorrect.44 But the court in a Minnesota decision,
where the action was to recover damages for breach of a contract by
which the defendant agreed to furnish materials of a stipulated quality,
to be used in the construction of a house by the plaintiff for a family
residence on lots owned by his wife, held that the defendant was
entitled to set up as a counterclaim an unpaid balance of the contract
price for the material, and, in case he established his counterclaim, to
enforce his lien therefor in the action, and to that end, to have the plain-
tiff's wife made a party thereto.4 5 'However, in North Carolina, de-
ceased's executor sued a tenant, for rent of estate property, in justice of
the peace court and recovered. On appeal to Superior Court defendant
(tenant) took a nonsuit, and further appealed to the Supreme Court.
In Superior Court, after hearing the case, one B was made a party
on motion of defendant West, who was a devisee of deceased. The
Supreme Court said it was error to grant the nonsuit, and to make B
a party after the nonsuit, and further said that the bringing in of B
changed the nature of the action from one for rent by a landlord to one
concerning the right to land and the rents from it, assigning the latter
as another reason for the holding.46 On the other hand, in an action
by a landlord against a third party, to whom a tenant had sold grain,
to recover the proceeds of the sale or the value of the grain, on the
ground that plaintiff had a landlord's lien thereon, in which the land-
42 Federal Lighterage Co., Inc. v. Italia-America Shipping Co., 125 Misc. 181,
210 N.Y. Supp. 458 (1925).
43 Citizens Insurance Co. of Missouri v. Etchen, 111 Kan. 545, 207 Pac. 782 (1922).44Annett v. Garland, 8 Utah 150, 30 Pac. 365 (1892).
45 Crosby v. Scott-Graff Lumber Co., 93 Minn. 475, 101 N.W. 610 (1904).
46 Shell v. West, 130 N.C. 171, 41 S.E. 65 (1902).
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lord denied waiving the lien, the tenant's assignee of the proceeds of
sale was properly impleaded since the real issue was whether the
landlord's lien had been waived. In this case the tenant assigned the
proceeds of the sale before collection, and the assignee commenced
an action against the third party vendee of the tenant upon a check
given by the third party, but upon which he had stopped payment
after discovery that the landlord claimed a lien on the grain.47 In a
Minnesota case a statement was made that persons executing a note
and mortgage and redeeding the land to the owner as accommodation
were not entitled, in a suit on the note, to have the owner brought
in as a party. The fact situation is peculiar. On June 11, 1923, defend-
ants Cashman executed their note for $1400 at 5% to plaintiff. In an
action on this note the defendants moved to have the Bank of Correll
made a party, and the motion was granted, but reversed on appeal.
The Correll bank was the owner of the land at the time the note
was given, and had owned it for several years. The plaintiff had a
mortgage which came due June 11, 1923, but the bank was in no way
liable on the mortgage debt. Negotiations between plaintiff and the
bank for the purpose of continuing the mortgage so as to protect the
equity of the bank in the land were had. Thereafter the bank deeded
to the Cashmans, without consideration, and then they gave the note
and mortgage sued on and redeeded to the plaintiff. The court states
that all that the Cashmans did was done as an accommodation to the
bank. The mortgage had not been foreclosed or paid.4 Again, in an
ejectment action plaintiff's grantor could not be brought in as a party
defendant and subjected to an action for damages arising from the
ejectment if plaintiff prevailed, where it was not shown that the plain-
tiff would be liable over to the defendants either on recovery of the
property or for damages for wrongful detention thereof, although
plaintiff's grantor was estopped from claiming any title to the disputed
land, because he pointed out the boundary to defendants and erected
improvements on the disputed land.49 However, a third party who had
made an indemnity agreement in favor of defendant landlord could
be impleaded by defendant in an action against the landlord by a tenant
for a sum deposited as security on the lease which had been assigned
to the plaintiff.50 But, in an action not affecting real property, the court
states that where a third person gave defendant an order for printing,
and defendant gave the identical order to plaintiff's assignor, the
defendant when sued for the work and defending on the ground that
4 Wallace v. Farmers Exchange Co., 197 Iowa 568, 197 N.W. 654 (1924).48Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Cashman, 181 Minn. 82, 231 N.W. 403 (1930).
49 Gilbert v. Mehrtens, 159 Misc. 702, 287 N.Y. Supp. 657 (1936).
50 125 West 45th Street Restaurant Corp. v. Framax Realty Corp., 249 App. Div.
589, 293 N.Y. Supp. 216 (1937).
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it was badly done, was entitled to have such third person brought in.
But in the same case the defendant did not have the right to implead
the plaintiff's assignor as a defendant, in order to litigate a counter-
claim against the assignor which was in excess of the amount demanded
in the complaint.5'
However, in Spruill v. Bank of Plymouth, an action was begun by
a depositor against the bank, to recover the amount of a check hon-
ored by the bank after receipt of the depositor's notice to stop pay-
ment. It was held that the payee of a check is not a necessary party so
long as the plaintiff claims no relief against him. But here the issue
was as to notice, and the bank claimed it was not notified and there-
fore that its payment of the check was proper. The court, however,
ruled that if the payee of the check be considered a proper party the
dismissal of the action as to the payee was not reviewable, since such
dismissal was not an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.5 2
In a suit by a lessor of oil and gas land for royalties due under the
lease, which are also claimed by the lessor of adjacent lands, the
latter must be made a party on the request of the lessee, so that he
may be concluded by the judgment rendered. 53 One of the few cases
arising in the state of Washington on the subject of compulsory inter-
vention held that since a bona fide holder of a trade acceptance could
have recovered from the maker regardless of the defenses against the
assignor, and the action of one not a bona fide holder could be defeated
by the maker interposing his defenses, and a complete determination
could therefore be had without the presence of other parties, the
assignor of the trade acceptance was not a necessary party.54
From a study of these cases presenting the problem of compulsory
intervention of third parties, on motion of the defendant, it may be
concluded that the minimum requirement is that the third party have
some interest in the controversy. The normal situation is where the
third party will become liable to defendant, if plaintiff succeeds. Usu-
ally, where the third party is necessary to a complete determination of
the controversy, the defendant may implead him as a matter of statu-
tory right. However, in every case, great latitude is accorded the
judgment of the trial court, and the appellate jurisdiction is loath to
overrule its decision, in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.
GEORGE R. FALLER.
51 Hughes v. Charles Schweinler Press, 161 Misc. 713, 293 N.Y. Supp. 259 (1936).
52163 N.C. 43, 79 S.E. 262 (1913).
53Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Stevens, 134 Ky. 306, 120 S.W. 282
(1909).
Ladd & Tilton Bank v. Rosenstein, 122 Wash. 301, 210 Pac. 677 (1922).
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